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Parodies make fun of a thing by copying enough of it to make it 
recognizable while subverting the message of the original.
1
 Most people 
don’t like being made fun of. Some of those people turn to intellectual 
property (IP) law in an effort to suppress those parodies. 
When IP owners use copyright law to suppress parodies, the courts 
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 1 The Supreme Court defines parody as the “joinder of reference and ridicule.” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994) (“It is this joinder of 
reference and ridicule that marks off the author’s choice of parody from . . . other types of 
comment and criticism . . . .”); see also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 
109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody borrows from the original but “differs [from it] in a way 
that may reasonably be perceived as commenting, through ridicule,” on the original’s 
character or meaning). We put off until Part III further discussion of the definition of a 
parody. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170498 
  
474 University of California, Davis [Vol. 47:473 
have generally rejected those claims. The Supreme Court in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. gave parody a fairly wide exemption under the 
fair use doctrine, at least where the parody didn’t substitute for the 
original work (as it almost never will).
2
 More recently, the Seventh 
Circuit held in a case involving a South Park episode that parody could 
defeat a copyright claim on a motion to dismiss, because the court 
needed only to compare the copyrighted work with the parody in order to 
resolve the fair use issue.
3
 
While copyright law gives broad rights of control over the creative 
work itself, trademark law protects consumers from confusion about the 
source of products. Given that, it might stand to reason that rejecting 
legal attacks on parodies is even more straightforward under trademark 
law; the interest of trademark law seems less connected to the 
suppression of parody than does copyright law. 
Nonetheless, courts have struggled with the evaluation of parody under 
trademark law. While many trademark courts have protected parodies, 
there are a surprising number of cases that hold obvious parodies illegal.
4
 
Our goal in this Article is to understand why, and to think about what 
circumstances (if any) should lead courts to find parody illegal. We 
conclude that, despite increasing attention to speech interests in recent 
years, the law’s treatment of parody reflects too much uncertainty, 
leaving would-be parodists vulnerable to threats of legal action by 
trademark holders. In particular, given the flexibility of likelihood of 
confusion analysis, parodists’ fate is usually determined by the subjective 
judgment of courts, whose treatment of parody often seems to turn on 
instinct rather than trademark principles. We suggest some doctrinal 
tools that offer greater predictability and quicker resolution of parody 
cases, while avoiding some of the shortcomings of more traditional 
infringement analysis. 
 
 2 510 U.S. 569, 576-94 (1994). Not all copyright cases protect parodies, however. 
See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 3 Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 4 See infra Part I.A (discussing cases). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170498 
  
2013] Parody as Brand 475 
I. PARODIES, BRAND PARODIES, AND THE LAW 
A. Traditional Parodies 
Parodies and their close kin, satires, are common in popular culture. 
So, too, are lawsuits filed against those parodies by irate trademark 
owners. Many of these cases involve classic examples of social 
commentary using — and targeting — brands. Courts have applied a 
variety of different theories to these cases, however. 
One approach, first crafted by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, allows the use of trademarks in expressive works as long as 
they have some artistic relevance to the work and do not explicitly 
mislead as to source.
5
 Rogers itself involved the use of “Ginger and 
Fred” as the title of a fictional film about two cabaret dancers whose act 
— and nicknames — copied the famous dancers Fred Astaire and Ginger 
Rogers. Ginger Rogers sued, claiming that the film violated her publicity 
rights and falsely suggested her involvement in the film. The court 
denied both claims, concluding that the First Amendment protects the 
use of names in titles of expressive works “unless the title has no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic 
relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the 
content of the work.”
6
 
Courts have adopted the Rogers test rather than likelihood of 
confusion analysis in a variety of cases involving trademarks used in 
expressive works. In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions,
7
 for 
example, the defendant was an artist who posed Barbie dolls nude in 
photographs in which they were attacked by vintage household 
appliances. The artist did not use the term “Barbie” (or the doll itself) to 
brand or sell goods; the art itself involved the trademarked doll, and the 
titles
8
 reflected that fact. As with much modern art, what exactly the 
artist was saying was not entirely clear, but it certainly seemed to be a 
commentary on Barbie herself. The court found no liability for this 
parody because the use of the term “Barbie” was “clearly relevant” to the 
defendant’s work, and “d[id] not explicitly mislead as to the source of 
the work.”
9
 In another Barbie case, the court invoked Rogers to allow the 
 
 5 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 6 Id. 
 7 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 8 For example, “Malted Barbie,” which featured “a nude Barbie placed on a vintage 
Hamilton Beach malt machine.” Id. at 796. 
 9 Id. at 807 (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 
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use of “Barbie Girl” as the name of a song that poked fun at the plasticity 
of the famous doll.
10
 And in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star 
Videos, Inc.,
11
 the plaintiff — the “Play Pen” strip bar — sued to stop the 
depiction of a similar strip bar called the “Pig Pen” in the video game 
Grand Theft Auto. Although the allusion to “Play Pen” was peripheral to 
the video game’s central theme, the court found it sufficiently relevant to 
the game’s expression to justify use of the mark, absent anything 
explicitly misleading about the use.
12
 
Other courts have reached similar results by reference to trademark 
law’s standard likelihood of confusion test. In Hormel Foods Corp. v. 
Jim Henson Productions, Inc.,
13
 for example, the court held that 
defendant’s use of a character named “SPA’AM” in a Muppets movie 
was a permissible parody of plaintiff’s “Spam” mark for potted meat. 
The female, porcine “Spa’am” character was designed to make at least 
some fun of Spam and its dubious relationship to more traditional forms 
of meat. But the court did not apply any sort of speech or parody-related 




Not all classic parody cases turn out well for the defendants, however. 
In Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,
15
 the court held that 
defendant’s antinuclear T-shirts, featuring a funny picture and the words 
“Mutant of Omaha,” were likely to confuse consumers into thinking the 
 
2002)).  
 10 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 11 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 12 See id. at 1100 (“[O]nly the use of a trademark with ‘no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work whatsoever’ does not merit First Amendment protection . . . . In other 
words, the level of relevance merely must be above zero.” (quoting MCA Records, Inc., 
296 F.3d at 902 and Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 
Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying Rogers to an 
expressive, non-parodic use). But see Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452-58 
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding question of fact as to whether song title “Rosa Parks” had any 
artistic relevance to rap song that repeatedly suggested that competing rappers should 
“move to the back of the bus”). 
 13 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 14 Id. at 505-08; see also, e.g., Black Dog Tavern Co. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48 (D. 
Mass. 1993) (finding “Black Hog” and “Dead Dog” marks unlikely to be confused with 
“Black Dog” trademark). Barton Beebe found that a parody defense is rarely asserted, but 
when asserted tends to be successful. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the 
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1596 n.65 (2006) 
[hereinafter Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests]; see also William McGeveran, 
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 68-70 (2008). 
 15 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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insurance company “Mutual of Omaha” had sponsored the shirts.
16
 In 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications,
17
 the court found illegal a 
fake advertisement in a humor magazine for “Michelob Oily,” a 
purported new brand of beer. The ad was designed to make fun of both 
brand differentiation and water pollution.
18
 In both cases, the court 
accepted (dubious) evidence that consumers were likely to be confused 
by the parodies despite their rather obvious parodic nature. In Deere & 
Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,
19
 the court rejected a competing tractor 
company’s use of the John Deere deer logo to attack the company in a 
comparative advertisement.
20
 The court found the use to be dilutive 
(perhaps by tarnishment, though the opinion suggests that the dilution 
might have been something other than tarnishment).
21
 In any event, the 
court thought that the fact that the Deere logo was being used to 
advertise competing products was undesirable, distinguishing it from 
uses for “worthy purposes of expression.”
22
 And in Coca-Cola Co. v. 
Gemini Rising, Inc.,
23
 the court also proceeded on a tarnishment theory. 
It held that a poster done in the style of a Coca-Cola ad that read “Enjoy 
Cocaine” infringed Coca-Cola’s “Enjoy Coke” mark because it 





 16 Id. at 398-401. 
 17 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 18 Id. at 773-77. 
 19 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 20 Id. at 44-45. 
 21 Id. at 45 (“The commercial takes a static image of a graceful, full-size deer-
symbolizing Deere’s substance and strength-and portrays, in an animated version, a deer 
that appears smaller than a small dog and scampers away from the dog and a lawn tractor, 
looking over its shoulder in apparent fear. Alterations of that sort, accomplished for the 
sole purpose of promoting a competing product, are properly found to be within New 
York’s concept of dilution because they risk the possibility that consumers will come to 
attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with 
inferior goods and services.”). 
 22 Id. at 44-45. 
 23 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 24 Id. at 1189. This finding was particularly remarkable given that the name “Coca-
Cola” derives from the soda’s inclusion of coca leaf derivatives more than a century ago. 
See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1920) (“Before 1900 
the beginning of the good will was more or less helped by the presence of cocaine, a drug 
that, like alcohol of caffein or opium, may be described as a deadly poison or as a 
valuable item of the pharmacopoeia according to the rhetorical purposes in view. The 
amount seems to have been very small, but it may have been enough to begin a bad habit 
and after the Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906, if not earlier, long before this suit was 
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In our view, these cases illustrate a distinction that should be 
categorical: a parody that makes fun of a trademark without adopting it 
as a brand should not be actionable under trademark law. This includes 
comparative advertising — poking fun at your competitor through a 
tongue-in-cheek ad — as well as use in expressive products like books, 
movies, T-shirts, or the like.
25
 We have emphasized elsewhere the role of 
the trademark use doctrine in weeding out general trademark claims that 
are not directed — as trademark law is supposed to be — at an effort to 
brand or advertise products using a mark.
26
 Trademark use is a logical 
filter to weed out cases that are about parodies featured in magazines, 
movies, TV shows, Twitter feeds, or any of a variety of other uses that 
don’t involve branding.
27
 While judicial adoption of a trademark use 
 
brought, it was eliminated from the plaintiff’s compound.” (citations omitted)). 
Ironically, Koke involved a claim that the Coca-Cola mark was deceptively 
misdescriptive because it (now wrongly) suggested that the soda still contained cocaine.  
 25 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. i (1995) (suggesting 
that parodies that don’t serve as brands “will often lie within the substantial constitutional 
protection accorded noncommercial speech and may thus be the subject of liability only in 
the most narrow of circumstances”). 
 26 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through 
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1682 (2007) [hereinafter Grounding Trademark] 
(“Strictly speaking, trademark infringement should require not only that a defendant be 
using the mark to promote its own products or services but also that it be using it ‘as a 
mark’-- i.e., to indicate the source or sponsorship of those products or services.”); Stacey 
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 785 (2004) [hereinafter Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs]. 
Our work here is part of a larger debate over trademark use. For other work on the issue, 
see, for example, Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of 
“Trademark Use,” 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 371, 376-87 (2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1597 (2007); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 
54 EMORY L.J. 507, 511-28 (2005); Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial 
Interest Confusion, Consumer Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (2004); Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of 
Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773 [hereinafter Trademark Use]. 
 27 There are an alarming number of such cases, some of them successful. See, e.g., 
Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(enjoining a movie about a beauty contest in a rural state from using the title “Dairy 
Queens”; the movie was eventually released as “Drop Dead Gorgeous”); Toho Co. v. 
William Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoining a book about 
Godzilla from using the title Godzilla!, despite the presence of disclaimers on both the 
front and back covers). Other plaintiffs have failed, but the fact that the suits were 
brought at all is worrisome. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 
F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2012) (reversing conclusion that painter infringed university 
trademarks by depicting actual university football games); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. 
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requirement has been uneven,
28
 trademark law has other tools to achieve 
this result for defendants who don’t use their parody as a brand. The 
 
Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1048-49 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (denying a strip 
club’s infringement claim against a video-game manufacturer that included a like-named 
strip club in its game); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923-24 
(C.D. Ill. 2003) (refusing to enjoin a depiction of bulldozers that resembled the plaintiff’s 
products in an animated film); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 
2d 1254, 1258, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (refusing to enjoin a depiction of a Slip-N-Slide 
toy in a movie); Compagnie Générale des Établisessements Michelin & Michelin Cie v. 
Nat’l Auto., Aerospace, Transp., and Gen. Workers Union of Can., [1997] 2 F.C. 306 
(Can.), available at http://reports.fja.gc.ca/eng/1997/1997fc19917.html (refusing to 
enjoin union from using the logo of the company it was trying to unionize as part of a 
leafleting campaign). 
 28 Many courts adopting the trademark use doctrine have relied upon the “in 
connection with” language in the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. 
Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding the appropriate inquiry in 
evaluating the “in connection with” requirement, as “whether [defendant] offers 
competing services to the public”); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936, 
939 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he licensing of a toll-free telephone number, without more, is 
not a ‘use’ within the meaning of the Lanham Act . . . .”); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 
Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623-26 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use of a 
telephone number that translated into 1-800-H0LIDAY — with a zero in place of the “O” 
— was not trademark “use” within the Lanham Act because the defendant had not 
advertised its services under the offending alphabetical translation). 
Others have relied on the “use in commerce” language. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. 
v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407-11 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on the “use in 
commerce” requirement to find no direct infringement by a party selling pop-up 
advertisements); Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 
855 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘[U]se in commerce’ appears to contemplate a trading upon the 
goodwill of or association with the trademark holder.”); Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal, 
LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (examining “[w]hether use of another 
company’s registered trademark in metadata or as part of a sponsored search constitutes 
use of a trademark in commerce under the Lanham Act”); Best W. Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 
CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006) (affirming 
summary judgment for infringement claim where “[plaintiff’s] complaint [did] not . . . 
describe a single instance where [defendant’s] mark was improperly used”); cf. Hamzik 
v. Zale Corp., No. 3:06-cv-1300, 2007 WL 1174863, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2007) 
(finding potential trademark use by a keyword advertiser that displayed plaintiff’s 
trademark in the text of its ad). 
Still others have held that the trademark use doctrine bars claims without specific 
reference to statutory language. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 
478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting a state dilution claim because “Lycos might 
profit by encouraging others to talk about UCS under the UCSY name, but neither that 
speech nor Lycos’s providing a forum for that speech is the type of use that is subject to 
trademark liability”); Nautilus Grp., Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 
C02-2420RSM, 2006 WL 3761367, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2006) (holding that an 
advertiser’s use of a keyword to generate a sponsored link to run a comparative 
advertisement was not a trademark use for dilution purposes); see also Merck & Co. v. 
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Trademark Dilution Revision Act makes it clear that parody cannot be 
dilutive when it is used “other than as a designation of source.”
29
 As for 
infringement, nominative fair use should protect comparative advertisers, 
and Rogers v. Grimaldi addresses expressive works: as long as the use of 
a trademark has some artistic relevance to an expressive product and 
does not explicitly mislead as to source, trademark law should not 
intervene.
30
 Using these doctrinal tools, we shouldn’t need to reach the 
likelihood of confusion inquiry in order to resolve cases in which a clear 
parody is used other than as a designation of source for a separate 
commercial product. 
Nor should the fact that a mark appears in the title of an expressive 
work change the outcome. As Rogers v. Grimaldi instructs, trademarks 
in titles should not infringe, as long as they bear some relationship to the 
 
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
Finally, some courts, including more recent decisions in two courts of appeals, have 
rejected the trademark use doctrine altogether. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 676 
F.3d 144, 161-63 (4th Cir. 2012); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127-31 
(2d Cir. 2009); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper, Inc., No. C03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 
WL 1159950, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (holding that a search engine’s sale of 
keyword-based advertising can constitute trademark use under the Lanham Act); Int’l 
Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676-80 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (enjoining 
keyword advertising by a gripe site); Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 
459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 321-24 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing a trademark claim based on 
keyword-based advertising); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 
282-93 (D.N.J. 2006) (allowing trademark claims against a pay-for-priority search engine 
based on its “sale” of keywords in exchange for prominent placement in search results); 
Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, 
at *1-3 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (allowing a trademark claim based on keyword-based 
advertising). 
 29 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2012). In any event, as we have argued elsewhere, 
dilution generally requires that the defendant use the term as a mark. See Stacey L. 
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 541, 542-44 (2008); see also Nat’l Bus. 
Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 536 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that dilution statute requires defendant to use mark “in identifying or distinguishing its 
own goods or services”). 
 30 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (Aqua’s song 
“Barbie Girl” was a nominative use of Mattel’s Barbie mark because the song was about 
Barbie). The question whether the defendant’s work is in fact about the plaintiff also 
comes up in right of publicity cases. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 
(6th Cir. 2003) (finding genuine question of fact as to whether use of “Rosa Parks” as 
song title was protected speech or violation of Parks’ Lanham Act and publicity rights); 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (considering both Lanham Act and right 
of publicity claims). 
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underlying expression and don’t lie.
31
 The speech interest in access to 
expressive works extends to their titles; consumers, as well as creators, 
benefit from a culture that allows subtle references and word play that 
draws from a variety of cultural reference points.
32
 This is true even if 
the use causes some level of confusion. As the Second Circuit pointed 
out in Rogers: 
[M]any titles with a celebrity’s name make no explicit statement 
that the work is about that person in any direct sense; the 
relevance of the title may be oblique and may become clear only 
after viewing or reading the work. As to such titles, the 
consumer interest in avoiding deception is too slight to warrant 
application of the Lanham Act. Though consumers frequently 
look to the title of a work to determine what it is about, they do 
not regard titles of artistic works in the same way as the names 
of ordinary commercial products. . . . [M]ost consumers are well 
aware that they cannot judge a book solely by its title any more 
than by its cover. We therefore need not interpret the Act to 
require that authors select titles that unambiguously describe 
what the work is about nor to preclude them from using titles 




In effect, Rogers does for expressive works what a robust trademark use 
doctrine could do more generally: it takes judicial notice that certain uses 
of trademarks (in expressive titles) don’t usually signal source, and 
balances the slight risk of confusion against the benefits of allowing such 
uses. We agree with the Second Circuit that parodies in expressive 
 
 31 A false statement of authorship or endorsement — such as “Jane Fonda’s Workout 
Book” or “authorized biography” — would cross the line into misleading speech. “If such 
explicit references were used in a title and were false as applied to the underlying work, 
the consumer’s interest in avoiding deception would warrant application of the Lanham 
Act, even if the title had some relevance to the work.” Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. But 
absent such overt statements of affiliation, “the slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s 
name might implicitly suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed 
by the danger of restricting artistic expression, and the Lanham Act is not applicable.” Id. 
at 1000. 
 32 E.g., Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. Afr. Breweries Int’l 2005 (1) SA 144 (CC) 
at 64-65 para. 109 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J., concurring) (“Humour is one of the great solvents 
of democracy. It permits the ambiguities and contradictions of public life to be articulated 
in non-violent forms. It promotes diversity. It enables a multitude of discontents to be 
expressed in a myriad of spontaneous ways. It is an elixir of constitutional health.”). 
 33 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999-1000. 
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products should generally be immune from liability, and we find it 
heartening that recent parody decisions reflect a trend toward the Rogers 
standard. From Ginger and Fred to Barbie Girl to Blender Barbie to the 
Pig Pen, courts have sanctioned the use of trademarks both within the 
works and in their titles. 
Indeed, a closer look at the decisions that find parody infringing 
suggests that one of three things is going on. First, some of these cases 
are misled by poor evidence of confusion. In Balducci, for instance, only 
6% of people surveyed thought that Michelob Oily was actually a new 
kind of beer,
34
 but fully half of those surveyed understood that it was a 
parody but thought that the humor magazine should have to get a 
license.
35
 That may be a form of confusion — specifically, confusion 
about what trademark law actually requires — but it is not confusion that 
causes the sort of harm trademark law cares about, and it should not be 
actionable.
36
 Similarly, in Mutual of Omaha, the plaintiff’s survey 
showed that 42% of respondents thought the “Mutant of Omaha” shirt 
“[called] to mind” Mutual of Omaha, and that 10% thought Mutual of 
Omaha “[went] along” with the shirt.
37
 Those questions are not the ones 
trademark law traditionally does or should care about.
38
 These cases are 
misled by poor surveys or improper questions to find confusion where it 
is in fact unlikely. 
 
 34 Suggesting that 6% of the country will believe absolutely anything. 
 35 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 36 See Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising 
Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 n.36 (1999) (making this critique of Balducci). See 
generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
413 (2010) [hereinafter Irrelevant Confusion] (arguing that trademark law should 
concentrate on confusion that may affect purchasing decisions); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1305 (2011) [hereinafter From A to B] (arguing that trademark law should 
limit itself to confusion that actually matters to consumers). Rebecca Tushnet notes that 
we increasingly see licenses for things that a generation ago we presumed no one would 
license, including parodies. That does not mean, though, that parodies should require 
licenses. See Rebecca Tushnet, Towards Symmetry in the Law of Branding, 21 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 971, 978-82 (2011). 
 37 Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 38 Indeed, the problem is worse than that; the survey question itself planted the idea 
of Mutual of Omaha’s acquiescence in respondents’ minds, asking: “Would you say that 
Mutual of Omaha goes along or does not go along with these T-shirts in order to make 
people aware of the nuclear war problem?” “Goes along” and “does not go along” were 
the only choices offered; “is unaware of,” “has nothing to do with,” and “doesn’t much 
care” apparently weren’t considered as possibilities. Id. at 400 n.5; see also id. at 403-04 
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (criticizing the survey). 
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Second, cases like Deere and Gemini are driven by a misunderstanding 
of the nature of dilution. The evil of trademark dilution (if there is one)
39
 
is that it weakens the association in the minds of consumers between the 
brand and the product by introducing another association between a 
different product and that brand.
40
 That’s not what’s happening in either 
Deere or Gemini. Gemini didn’t involve product branding at all, and 
accordingly wouldn’t be actionable under the federal dilution statute. 
And the use in Deere was a commercial use of the mark, but not one that 
branded the competitor’s goods; it used Deere’s mark to refer to Deere’s 
goods. The courts in these cases seem to have misunderstood tarnishment 
as saying something bad about the trademark owner, rather than its 




The third factor that leads courts astray in these cases is a general 
aversion to free riding. Some judges just don’t like it when people make 
money from evoking someone else’s mark. In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing 
Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, Inc.,
42
 for example, the defendant sold “Hard 
 
 39 While we have suggested elsewhere that dilution can increase search costs, at least 
in theory, like many scholars we have some doubt about whether dilution is a harm worth 
worrying about. Rebecca Tushnet, for example, has demonstrated that consumers can 
handle linguistic clutter. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law 
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 527-46 (2008) [hereinafter Gone in Sixty 
Milliseconds]. Paul Heald and Bob Brauneis have shown that sellers appear to have little 
incentive to adopt famous trademarks as the name of non-competing products. Paul J. 
Heald & Robert Brauneis, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark 
Dilution by Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2533, 2537 (2011). For 
other articles questioning whether dilution should be actionable, see, for example, Glynn 
S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); Kenneth L. Port, The 
“Unnatural” Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 
85 TRADEMARK REP. 525 (1995). 
 40 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 313 
(2003) (contending that dilution law should limit itself to the loss of singularity of unique 
marks).  
 41 Mark McKenna thinks that this is a problem with tarnishment itself. See Mark P. 
McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 
134-36 (2012) [hereinafter Consumer Decision-Making Theory]. But we think the two are 
analytically separate: changing how a consumer feels about the plaintiff’s products is 
different than associating those products with defendant’s noxious products in the minds 
of consumers. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of 
Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK 
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 65, 72 & n.26 (Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 
2007) [hereinafter A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines]; Tushnet, Gone in Sixty 
Milliseconds, supra note 39, at 523-24. 
 42 776 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
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Rain Cafe” t-shirts in rain-plagued Seattle. After a cursory analysis 
finding likelihood of confusion, the court rejected defendant’s parody 
claim, concluding: “A defendant’s claim of parody will be disregarded 
where the purpose of the similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s 
popularity for the defendant’s own commercial use.”
43
 
Trademark law, however, does not and should not aim to prevent all 
free riding. The law targets harms that result from confusion and, at least 
in theory,
44
 from the loss of singularity of particularly famous marks.
45
 
Parodies that conjure up a trademark for humor and turn a profit in the 
process are engaged in perfectly lawful behavior, absent confusion or 
dilution. 
For traditional parodies, then, the legal rule should be simple, even if it 
is not always followed: making fun of a trademark owner by doing 
something other than using their mark to brand your own products does 
not violate the Lanham Act. 
B. Brand Parodies 
Increasingly, however, we’ve witnessed a new phenomenon: lawsuits 
against parodies that serve as brands, logos, or taglines for commercial 
products.
46
 Haute Diggity Dog sells “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys, and Louis 
Vuitton is not happy about it.
47
 Macy’s sells a diaper bag called “Gucchi 
Goo,” and Gucci sues (and wins).
48
 The Utah tourism bureau describes 
the state as having the “Greatest Snow on Earth,” a play on the Ringling 
 
 43 Id. at 1462 (citing Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 
1986)); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“The difference between a ‘parody’ and a ‘knock-off’ is the difference between fun and 
profit.”). 
 44 See sources cited supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 45 See, e.g., Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 
2013) (“[A] trademark holder has no right to police ‘unnecessary’ use of its mark. 
Whether necessary or not, a defendant’s use of a mark must be confusing in the relevant 
statutory sense for a plaintiff to raise a viable infringement claim.” (emphasis in 
original)); see also Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra 
note 26, at 786-99. 
 46 A related but distinct phenomenon is the use of a corporate or personal name as the 
title of a “fake” Facebook or Twitter account. This is impersonation, though not branding 
per se. For discussion, see Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark 
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 851 (2010). 
 47 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
 48 See Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
  
2013] Parody as Brand 485 
Brothers’ “Greatest Show on Earth” mark.
49
 Black Bear Roastery sells 
“Charbucks” coffee to poke fun at the famous brand’s dark roast while 
cheekily offering its own dark-roast alternative.
50
 A Vermont hippie 
invites people to “Eat More Kale,” and Chik-Fil-A thinks he’s making 
fun of its “Eat Mor Chickin” mark.
51
 Hogg Wyld sells plus-size jeans 
under the name Lardache, and jeans-maker Jordache is not amused.
52
 A 
college student sells “South Butt” t-shirts with the tagline “Never Stop 
Relaxing,” raising the ire of The North Face brand with its “Never Stop 
Exploring” slogan.
53
 A bar owner names its kitschy establishment the 






In many ways, this new form of parody resembles the old. It’s 
motivated by a desire to comment or criticize, and it’s unlikely to 




 49 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 50 See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir. 
2009). See generally What It’s All About?, BLACK BEAR MICRO ROASTERY, 
https://blackbearcoffee.com/Starbucks/What%27s_it_all_about.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 
2013) (offering Black Bear’s account of the reason for its choices of name). 
 51 See James Lantz et al., A Defiant Dude, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/ 
projects/1674889308/a-defiant-dude (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).  
 52 See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1483-84 (10th Cir. 
1987).  
 53 See Kelsey Volkmann, South Butt vs. North Face, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (Oct. 16, 2010), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/blog/2009/09/south_butt_vs_north_face.html. The 
defendant was ultimately enjoined in a consent judgment and held in contempt of that 
judgment for selling a separate T-shirt that read “The Butt Face.” See North Face Apparel 
Corp. v. Williams Pharmacy Inc., No. 4:09-CV-02029-RWS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
145987, at *1-9 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 54 See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191-93 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 55 See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 
490 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Spy Notes” not infringing “Cliff Notes”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. 
VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (“Buttwiper” dog toy likely to be 
confused with “Budweiser” beer-related products); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. 
Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Timmy Holedigger” pet 
perfume not likely to be confused with “Tommy Hilfiger” perfume); Grey v. Campbell 
Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (“Dogiva” dog biscuits infringe “Godiva” 
chocolate mark), aff’d, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987). And even more brand parodies have 
flown under the radar, like the baby shirt that reads “iPood.” 
 56 The lines between the two types of parody also blur as trademark owners arrogate 
to themselves the right to control secondary markets for the sale of T-shirts, memorabilia, 
and the like. The use of a brand on a T-shirt is classically an expressive use, but 
trademark owners (and some courts) have increasingly treated this merchandising as a 
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other ways, however, parody as brand differs from parody as product 
because the parody is being used as an indicator of source. Building a 
brand name around someone else’s trademark looks, to some observers, 
like a classic case of “free riding,” with the parodist taking advantage of 
the allure of the targeted brand. Trademark holders, not surprisingly, 
abhor the practice and sue to prevent it. 
But trademark law is not — and has never been — about preventing all 
forms of free riding.
57
 Trademark law, even as it has expanded to prevent 
dilution, has purported to focus on preventing harm, either to the 
trademark holder or to the public (and sometimes to both). Those who 
develop brands-as-parody may well be benefiting from the appeal of a 
famous brand, but if their use is an effective parody, it doesn’t cause the 
kind of harm that trademark law is designed to address. These brands-as-
parody, moreover, offer a valuable form of social commentary. Even 
more than non-commercial forms of parody, the subversive use of a 
parody as brand invites critical reflection on the role of brands in society 
and the extent to which we define ourselves by them.
58
 
Brands that parody, in other words, offer a unique platform for 
expression and pose little threat to trademark law’s core values. As a 
matter of doctrine, however, the fact that a parody is also a brand 
complicates the trademark analysis. The trademark use doctrine is no 
longer a bar to an infringement suit; Black Bear is in fact using the term 
“Charbucks” as a mark to brand its products. Nominative use becomes 
harder, though not impossible, for the same reason. “Charbucks” is in 
fact nominative use in a sense; buyers presumably understand that it is a 
reference to Starbucks. But it is not only a nominative use; it is 
simultaneously a brand in its own right, and if it is memorable it may 
 
form of branding within the trademark owner’s control. For criticism of this 
phenomenon, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: 
Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005) [hereinafter Merchandising 
Right]; Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137 
(2010) [hereinafter Owning Mark(et)s]. 
 57 For discussion, see, for example, Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra 
note 56; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031 (2005). 
 58 See, e.g., Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489 
(2006) [hereinafter Semiotic Disobedience] (discussing brand parodies as a form of 
cultural disobedience); Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images in 
Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 891-95 (2011) (noting special 
need of commentators to access expressive aspects of visual marks); cf. Deven R. Desai, 
From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 999-1009 (2012) [hereinafter From 
Trademarks to Brands] (exploring personal role of brands in culture). 
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serve the traditional function of cementing Black Bear’s product in 
people’s minds.
59
 When a parody is also a brand, a number of courts 
have concluded that the analysis is the same as it is for any other 
trademark case: we ask whether confusion or dilution is likely, and if it 
is, the use is unlawful.
60
 In other words, those courts do not give parody a 
defense or any special treatment. 
Perhaps it doesn’t matter. Most parodies are unlikely to confuse 
consumers or to dilute the singularity of a famous trademark.
61
 Black 
Bear customers who buy Charbucks coffee presumably understand that 
they are not buying coffee at a Starbucks; they also seem unlikely to 
think that Starbucks has authorized a new, self-parodying blend and let 
Black Bear sell it. Nor does Charbucks make Starbucks less distinctive as 
a brand of its own; to the contrary, it only enhances Starbucks’ fame. The 
same goes for The Greatest Snow on Earth and Ringling Brothers, or 
Chewy Vuiton dog toys and Louis Vuitton. So maybe we don’t need a 
defense to protect brand parodies; they will take care of themselves. 
That answer seems unsatisfactory, and not merely because some brand 




 59 For this reason, courts have given lower First Amendment protection to parodic 
brands than to other forms of trademark parodies. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 
221 F. Supp. 2d at 415-16 (“When a parodist makes trademark use of another’s mark, it 
should be entitled to less indulgence, even if this results in some residual effect on the 
free speech rights of commercial actors.”). 
 60 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he claim of parody is not really a separate ‘defense’ . . . but merely a 
way of phrasing the traditional response that customers are not likely to be confused as to 
the source, sponsorship or approval.”); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 
415-16 (applying traditional likelihood of confusion analysis to case involving brand 
parody). The leading treatise endorses this position: 
Some parodies will constitute an infringement, some will not. But the cry of 
“parody!” does not magically fend off otherwise legitimate claims of trademark 
infringement or dilution. There are confusing parodies and non-confusing 
parodies. All they have in common is an attempt at humor through the use of 
someone else’s trademark. A non-infringing parody is merely amusing, not 
confusing.  
6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
31:153 (4th ed. 2013). 
 61 For discussion of the likelihood of confusion test as applied to parodies, see David 
A. Simon, The Confusion Trap: Rethinking Parody in Trademark Law, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter The Confusion Trap]. 
 62 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., 666 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo. 
2008) (finding “Buttwiper” T-shirts likely to be confused with “Budweiser” brand); 
Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting a 
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Confusion is a fact-specific inquiry, often heavily reliant on manipulable 
survey evidence and subject to an ever-expanding notion of what it takes 
to confuse.
63
 If confusion over whether the defendant needed a license is 
actionable, then virtually any brand evocation invites an expensive and 
unpredictable trial.
64
 Even if the law could guarantee the right result at 
trial, many parodists are small companies without the will or resources to 
fight a case all the way to trial.
65
 Many will cave in and abandon their 
parodies rather than hire a lawyer. 
Dilution presents a different problem for brand parodies. While there is 
an explicit defense for parody in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, it 
expressly applies only to parodies that use the mark “other than as a 
designation of source.”
66
 Brand parodies, by contrast, do not benefit from 
the defense. That doesn’t mean they are dilutive, of course; the Fourth 
Circuit found in Louis Vuitton that Chewy Vuiton was not. But it does 
mean that the parody is to be evaluated under the normal standards of 
blurring or tarnishment, a set of fact-intensive standards that map poorly 
 
preliminary injunction on use of “Gucchi Goo” mark on diaper bags because mark could 
be confused with “Gucci” brand). Bill McGeveran suggested to us that this is changing, 
and that more recent cases are more favorable to parodies. But that’s not universally true, 
as Starbucks demonstrates. See also PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Thread Pit, Inc., 
Cancelation No. 92047436, at 15 (T.T.A.B. 2012) (canceling clothing mark that depicted 
a polo player falling off a horse as likely to confuse consumers of the Polo brand, noting 
“parody is not a defense if the marks are otherwise confusingly similar”). 
 63 In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), for 
example, the court found infringement by the “Michelob Oily” parody, reversing the 
district court on likelihood of confusion, because even though only 6% of the public 
thought Michelob Oily was a new brand of beer, “over half” of respondents “thought 
Balducci needed Anheuser-Busch’s approval to publish the ad.” Id. at 775. In doing so, 
the court added a consumer’s misunderstanding of the law to the kinds of confusion 
apparently actionable under the Lanham Act. See also Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of 
Boca, 725 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding high degrees of confusion based 
on survey that asked consumers whether they thought trademark holder’s permission was 
required for “Dom Popignon” popcorn); cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 
746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting survey that asked leading question about whether 
Donkey Kong manufacturer needed permission from the owner of the King Kong mark). 
 64 See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 436-39. 
 65 For discussion of this problem, see, for example, James Gibson, Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007). For application 
to trademark parody cases, see Regina Schaffer-Goldman, Cease and Desist: 
Tarnishment’s Blunt Sword in Its Battle Against the Unseemly, the Unwholesome, and the 
Unsavory, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1241 (2010). Cf. Bruce P. 
Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing: Parody Lawsuits 
Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 995-97 (2004) (copyright cases). 
 66 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
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to uses expressly intended to evoke a famous mark.
67
 The statutory 
factors focus on the strength and fame of the plaintiff’s mark and the 
possibility of association between the two marks.
68
 While some might 
worry about brands that draw strength from association with a famous 
mark,
69
 in the context of parody we should expect that the defendant both 
targets famous marks and does so by creating an association between the 
mark and the parody. Indeed, that’s the essence of parody. Brand 
parodies, then, simply don’t fit comfortably with the statutory dilution 
factors. It isn’t that the blurring factors necessarily make brand parodies 
unlawful, though many of them may be primed to line up in favor of the 
trademark owner, but rather that the questions the statute asks are largely 
tangential to the issues that matter in evaluating a parody. 
Unlike blurring, the statute is largely silent on what dilution by 
tarnishment means. We have argued elsewhere that courts must 
distinguish between a defendant’s use that tarnishes by associating the 
brand name with the defendant’s noxious product (actionable) and a 
defendant’s use that “tarnishes” because it disparages the plaintiff’s 
product (not actionable).
70
 On this view, parody will generally not be 
dilution by tarnishment, except by accident. The point of a parody is to 
target the plaintiff’s work. Even a branded parody is aimed primarily at 
making fun of the plaintiff’s work, not at marketing unrelated products 
that are shoddy or offensive. That doesn’t mean a brand parody can 
never tarnish,
71
 but courts must be careful not to confuse making fun of 
the plaintiff with tarnishing. 
 
 67 See id. A rote application of the statutory factors for dilution by blurring will 
almost always result in a finding in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. 
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 105-10 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that all 
but one of the statutory blurring factors weighed in favor of plaintiff). 
 68 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 69 But see sources cited supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 70 See Dogan & Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines, supra note 
41, at 72 & n.26.  
 71 The most likely context in which a brand parody could tarnish is when the “parody” 
appears on pornographic or drug-related products. Courts appear to be moving toward a 
presumption of tarnishment when a seller of such services adopts a mark that evokes a 
famous brand. See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 
2010) (adopting “a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong inference, that a 
new mark used to sell sex-related products is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a 
clear semantic association between the two”). We have our doubts about this precedent, 
especially to the extent that it reaches marks that evoke, without replicating, the famous 
brand. See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 40 (criticizing precedent that finds tarnishment based on 
mere evocation of famous brands). For a critique of the presumption that a relationship with 
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Brand parodies, then, don’t fit well within existing trademark 
infringement or dilution law. Parodies generally don’t confuse 
consumers, and because they refer back to the plaintiff’s mark directly 
they will not generally blur or tarnish that mark in the way dilution law 
prohibits. True parodies thus cause none of the harms that trademark law 
seeks to avoid. But because neither law is structured with parodies in 
mind, rote application of infringement and dilution standards can result 
in a condemnation of even obvious parodies. Lacking tools specifically 
designed for parody, courts treat it in an ad hoc way that reflects their 
own subjective assessment of the value or parody and the morality of 
free rides. The fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, moreover, means a 
long and costly process, which alone may deter parodies.
72
 
The solution, we believe, lies in a more consistent and predictable 
approach to brand parodies under both infringement and dilution law. In 
contrast to copyright law, we have seen little convergence in the courts’ 
treatment of even basic questions involving trademark parodies. Given 
 
sex tarnishes, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 119 (2012). If the growing presumption holds, however, we can 
imagine it applying to some arguably parodic brands. The use of “Live American Girl 
Dolls” on a strip club, for example, may constitute tarnishment, even if it was adopted in 
part as a sarcastic commentary on the wholesome image of the famous doll label. Similarly, 
consider Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d 
Cir. 1979), involving a porn movie from the 1970’s, called “Debbie Does Dallas,” that 
depicts the star in a Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders outfit in one scene. Id. at 202-03. Under 
Rogers v. Grimaldi there is surely artistic relevance, and the comment on the Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders as selling sexuality seems pretty obvious. At the same time, one can 
imagine why the Dallas Cowboys viewed the association as tarnishing. Still other examples 
of arguable parodies that may tarnish because of their offensive or sexual content include 
the sale of hats labeled “Cuntier” that imitate the “Cartier” brand, see Misty White Sidell, 
New Cartier Spoof Finds Itself in Hot Water with the Brand, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 8, 2013), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/08/new-cartier-spoof-finds-itself-in-hot-
water-with-the-brand.html, and singer Chubby Checker’s suit against a company that 
supplied a penis-size calculation app for a mobile phone that it called “The Chubby 
Checker.” See Evans v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. C 13-02477 WHA, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 115856, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013). Full disclosure: Lemley’s firm 
represents the defendant in this case.  
As in copyright cases, part of the challenge is to determine how much of the use owes 
itself to critical commentary, and how much is simply a convenient way to capture 
attention through use of someone else’s mark. If the commentary is insignificant and the 
use is likely to tarnish the famous mark through dual association with an unsavory 
product, then the balance may tilt in favor of the trademark holder. But where it is the 
commentary that the trademark owner objects to, the law should not give the trademark 
owner the power to restrict that commentary. 
 72 On the problem of in terrorem settlements in IP cases, see Gibson, supra note 65. 
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the increasing prevalence of parody as brand, the time has come for a 
more considered analysis that balances legitimate (or at least plausible) 
trademark holder concerns against the public’s interest in this form of 
critical speech. 
II. THE VALUE OF BRAND PARODIES 
Whether or not they believe that a particular parody deserves legal 
protection, courts and commentators seem to agree that parody has social 
value as critical speech. As the Supreme Court has explained, “Like less 
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social 
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating 
a new one.”
73
 Parodies make us think while making us chuckle; they 
offer a funny and often biting lens through which to view our cultural 
icons. From Henry Fielding’s “Shamela”
74
 to Alice Randall’s “The Wind 
Done Gone,”
75
 from Tina Fey’s parody of Sarah Palin
76
 to the Simpsons’ 
cracks about “Mapple,”
77
 parodies have, for centuries, had an “unerring 
ability both to delight and to confound.”
78
 
Despite their general appreciation of parody, however, courts show 
distinctly less enthusiasm for parodies that serve as brands. To some 
extent, their objection is doctrinal: both First Amendment and trademark 
jurisprudence give special status to non-commercial speech.
79
 But the 
 
 73 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also L.L. 
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 74 See generally CONNY KEYBER, AN APOLOGY FOR THE LIFE OF MRS. SHAMELA 
ANDREWS (1741) (writing under a pseudonym, Henry Fielding presents a parody of 
SAMUEL RICHARDSON, PAMELA (1740)). 
 75 See generally ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001) (presenting a parody 
of MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936)). 
 76 E.g., SNL Tina Fey then Gov. Palin, YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IE-OCDexYrU.  
 77 See The Simpsons — Steve Mobs, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=CZGIn9bpALo. 
 78 LINDA HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY: THE TEACHINGS OF TWENTIETH-
CENTURY ART FORMS, at xvii (2000 ed. 1985). See generally SIMON DENTITH, PARODY 
(John Drakakis ed., 2000) (exploring historical role of parody); MARGARET A. ROSE, 
PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN, AND POST-MODERN (Richard Macksey & Michael Sprinker 
eds., 1993) (examining theories and uses of parody from ancient to contemporary times); 
UNIV. PRESS, THE OXFORD BOOK OF PARODIES (John Gross ed., 2010) (same). 
 79 Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415-16 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), for example, found no likelihood of confusion between “Timmy 
Holedigger” dog perfume and “Tommy Hilfiger” people perfume, but noted that because 
the parody was serving as a brand, it was not entitled to any special First Amendment 
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trouble with brand parodies transcends doctrine; courts seem to struggle 
over their own intuitions about whether a defendant’s commercial 
objectives undermine its speech interest in the parody.
80
 Given the 
malleability of confusion and dilution analysis, these judicial instincts 
often dictate the outcome in trademark litigation.
81
 
Yet there’s a strong argument that, at least in the trademark context, 
incorporating a parody into a brand serves expressive goals that could 
not be realized through ordinary, non-branding speech. Many — perhaps 
most — branding parodies have a doubly subversive message. They are 
using a brand not only to lampoon the targeted brand, but also to call 
attention to the pervasiveness of branding in our society. Parodies, in 
general, replicate the central features of a particular work to “reference 
and ridicule” the work.
82
 Brand parodies do more: they not only borrow 
from the trademark itself, but they also appropriate the device of 
branding and employ it to make us think critically about the role of 
brands in our culture. The dog chew toy in Louis Vuitton, for example, 
“pokes fun at the elegance and expensiveness of a LOUIS VUITTON 
handbag” but also “irreverently presents haute couture as an object for 
casual canine destruction.”
83




treatment and instead required analysis under the likelihood of confusion test. See also 
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding no 
dilution in part because defendant “did not use Bean’s marks to identify or promote 
goods or services to consumers; it never intended to market the ‘products’ displayed in 
the parody”); cf. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
“Barbie Girl” as title of song non-commercial speech because, in addition to its 
commercial purpose of selling the song, “the song also lampoons the Barbie image and 
comments humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she represents”). 
 80 See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 
1454 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (“[D]efendant’s claim of parody will be disregarded where the 
purpose of the similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the 
defendant’s own commercial use.”); cf. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 
1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The difference between a ‘parody’ and a ‘knock-off’ is the 
difference between fun and profit.”).  
This is not a problem limited to parodies. Courts have stretched to find defendant’s 
uses to be commercial, and therefore infringing, when they think the defendant stands to 
make money from their use, even when it seems otherwise clearly noninfringing. See 
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 81 See Greg Lastowka, Trademark’s Daemons, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 790 (2011) 
(“The test for infringement provides a wonderful smokescreen for a jurist’s hidden 
agenda.”); see also Beebe, Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests, supra note 14, at 
1614-16.  
 82 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994). 
 83 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 261 (4th 
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Trademark holders, of course, would prefer not to face this kind of 
ridicule of their brands or their branding practices. But trademark law 
does not exist to suit the needs of trademark holders; it aims to promote 
broader social objectives. As a result, whether or not trademark law 
should condemn brand parodies depends on whether they threaten 
trademark law’s normative goals. 
We have written elsewhere about the rationale for — and the costs of 
— laws protecting trademarks.
85
 Despite an active contemporary debate 
over its descriptive accuracy and desirability,
86
 the dominant theoretical 
justification for trademarks remains an economic one. By providing 
shorthand signals about products, trademarks lower the costs of 
transferring information between buyers and sellers. By protecting the 
integrity of this product information, trademark law can facilitate more 
transparent and competitive markets. 
This account, however, comes with two important caveats. First, 
because fair competition remains the ultimate goal of trademark law, the 
law’s information-related objectives must sometimes give way to 
competition concerns. Trademark rules like functionality, fair use (both 
descriptive and nominative), and genericide are all designed to promote 
competition and market access, even when it means losing some 
informational clarity for consumers.
87
 Second, even the most modest 
version of trademark law — say, one focused only on passing off — 
creates the opportunity for rent-seeking behavior and the risk of 
monopoly.
88
 While trademarks do convey objective information about 
 
Cir. 2007). 
 84 Id.; see also Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(“[S]ome purchasers might resent paying a premium to be a walking billboard and would 
relish the opportunity to mock trendy folks who wear labels on their sleeves.”). 
 85 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines, supra 
note 41 (discussing rationale and costs of trademark laws); Dogan & Lemley, Grounding 
Trademark, supra note 26 (same); Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, supra note 56 
(same); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 26 
(same). 
 86 See Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 60, 67-77 (2008); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1896-916 (2007); Jeremy N. Sheff, The (Boundedly) 
Rational Basis of Trademark Liability, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 333 (2007). 
 87 For more detail on these and other competition-oriented limiting doctrines, see 
generally Deven R. Desai, An Information Approach to Trademarks, 100 GEO. L.J. 2119 
(2012) [hereinafter Information Approach to Trademarks]; Dogan & Lemley, A Search-
Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines, supra note 41. 
 88 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? 
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products, they can also serve as vessels of advertising-laden prestige, 
status, and brand personality that often bear little relation to any 
objective measure of product quality.
89
 This kind of artificial product 
differentiation can lead to higher prices and deadweight loss.
90
 Whether 
we view this as a fundamental problem or a minor glitch in the system, it 
is an inevitable effect of trademark protection, and it raises real economic 
concerns. 
As trademark law grows increasingly immodest — by protecting 
product designs against fears of post-sale confusion, for instance — these 
costs associated with trademark protection grow.
91
 Producers can now 
differentiate their products not only through names, but also through 
their “branded” product attributes. Luxury brands, in particular, thrive on 
the very fact of their scarcity and its attendant high price. Consumers 
demand these brands at least in part because of the image of distinction 
and wealth that they convey. Product use and consumption, in turn, 
become a form of expression, in which wearers or users of luxury-
branded products project to the world their exalted status.
92
 Wearing, 
consuming, or riding in a luxury-branded product conveys a very public 
message about the consumer’s affluence and values. 
Our goal here is not to pass judgment on these economic and cultural 
phenomena. Whether one believes that brand-based product 
differentiation promotes social welfare or reduces it,
93
 it undeniably 
 
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2059-66 (2012); Lunney, 
supra note 39, at 367-69 (describing intellectual, political, and legal history of trademark 
law, including early debates over the tension between its informational objectives and its 
monopolistic tendencies). 
 89 See Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 792 (2012) 
[hereinafter Veblen Brands]. 
 90 See Ann Bartow, Counterfeits, Copying and Class, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 707, 707-08 
(2011); Sheff, Veblen Brands, supra note 89, at 825. 
 91 See Lunney, supra note 39, at 421-39; Sheff, Veblen Brands, supra note 89, at 818. 
 92 See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 809, 821-24 (2010) [hereinafter Sumptuary Code]. For a celebration of this fact, 
see Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 282 (2013). 
 93 Cf. Beebe, Sumptuary Code, supra note 92 (suggesting that luxury brands play the 
role of a modern “sumptuary code” that distinguishes high-class from low-class 
citizenry). Compare Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for 
Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605 (2007) (contending that 
prestige goods can actually enhance consumer welfare by offering a host of non-physical 
attributes that bring utility to consumers), with Lunney, supra note 39 (claiming that 
property-based trademark protection reduces social welfare), and Sheff, Veblen Brands, 
supra note 89 (contending that legal protection of luxury brands is unnecessary and 
harmful to consumer interests). 
  
2013] Parody as Brand 495 
plays a major role in our economy and our society. Brands shape our 
communities and define our values. And while the traditional economic 
account views brands as conveying information unidirectionally — from 
producer to consumer — brands also convey information about the 
consumer and allow members of the public to communicate to each 
other.
94
 By selling branded products, producers enable us to brand 
ourselves. Indeed, in the modern world of luxury brands this is arguably 
the primary function of brands. Traditional trademarks serve as the 
source of goods and therefore protect the customer from fake goods. By 
contrast, Nike swooshes, red shoe bottoms, and Chanel purse logos are 
not really about ensuring purchasers make the right decision, but about 
allowing purchasers to tell the rest of the world about that decision. Were 
it otherwise, known counterfeits wouldn’t be so popular.
95
 Brands, then, 
don’t just help trademark owners speak; they help all of us speak. And 




Which brings us back to brand parody. As discussed above, brands that 
parody have a dual target: the brand itself and the phenomenon of 
branding. Given the prevalence of branding and its economic and social 
impact, commentary about both brands and branding is a matter of public 
concern.
97
 If they succeed in the market, moreover, these parodic brands 
 
 94 See Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, supra note 58, at 1036-44; see also Desai, 
Information Approach to Trademarks, supra note 87, at 2120-21 (contending that 
trademarks should be understood as information channels). 
 95 Cf. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993) 
(“Where trademarks once served only to tell the consumer who made the product, they 
now often enhance it or become a functional part of it.”). 
 96 See, e.g., NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (1999) (recounting popular movements designed 
to counter the message of dominant brands by, among other things, exposing brand 
hypocrisy); MC LARS, NO LOGO (Horris Records & Oglio Records 2009) (mocking the 
mocking of brand hypocrisy). See generally Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation 
and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341 (2011) [hereinafter The Law of 
Reputation] (noting broader community interest in the construction of individual and 
corporate reputation); McKenna, Consumer Decision-Making Theory, supra note 41 
(suggesting that persuasive, non-deceptive uses of marks by third parties can have social 
value). For a discussion of the act of subverting the meaning of a brand as itself speech-
significant, see Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, supra note 58, at 554-68. 
 97 See, e.g., Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. Afr. Breweries Int’l 2005 (1) SA 144 
(CC) at 62 para. 105 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J., concurring) (“The companies that own famous 
trademarks exert substantial influence over public and political issues, making them and 
their marks ripe and appropriate targets for parody and criticism.”); Deven R. Desai, 
Speech, Citizenry, and the Market, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/Desai,%20Deven% 
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most likely do so because they offer some value to consumers — because 
their message resonates with a substantial audience. Just as prestige 
brands confer value to consumers who want to project an image of 
exclusivity, so brand parodies bring utility to consumers seeking to 
project a more rebellious or sardonic message.
98
 Absent some harm to 
the informational function of the underlying trademark, the availability 
of this new type of product likely increases social welfare.
99
 Further, if 
brands are part of a conversation between consumers, not just with 
trademark owners, brand parodies allow others to participate in that 
conversation with a different, unapproved message.
100
 In so doing, it 
helps us define ourselves. As Salman Rushdie put it, “[t]hose who do not 
have power over the story that dominates their lives, power to retell it, 
rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and change it as times change, 
truly are powerless, because they cannot think new thoughts.”
101
 
If the parody is effective, moreover — if consumers get the joke — it’s 
 
20-%20Paper.pdf (“Like other public figures, corporations affect public affairs, take 
political positions, engage in matters of public concern and public controversy, and have 
reputations.”). 
 98 They also make life more fun by adding some levity to our lives. As Justice Sachs 
of the South African Constitutional Court proclaimed, in a case involving a parody of a 
beer brand: 
The Constitution cannot oblige the dour to laugh. It can, however, prevent the 
cheerless from snuffing out the laughter of the blithe spirits among us. Indeed, 
if our society became completely solemn because of the exercise of state power 
at the behest of the worthy, not only would all irrelevant laughter be 
suppressed, but temperance considerations could end up placing beer-drinking 
itself in jeopardy. And I can see no reason in principle why a joke against the 
government can be tolerated, but one at the expense of what used to be called 
Big Business, cannot. 
Laugh It Off Promotions (1) SA at 63-64 para. 107 (Sachs, J., concurring). 
 99 To be precise, the parodist and the people who view the parody generally benefit. 
There may be individuals who value the purity of brand integrity and oppose parody for 
its own sake. A utilitarian calculus would have to include their preferences too. See 
Manta, supra note 92, at 261. But we are skeptical that the views of these few people are 
so strongly held that they will outweigh the value of parody to others, including the 
parodist. 
 100 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1585 
(1993) (arguing that courts choose encouraging accurate communication over 
maximizing returns to trademark owners). 
 101 SALMAN RUSHDIE, One Thousand Days in a Balloon, reprinted in SALMAN 
RUSHDIE: A POSTMODERN READING OF HIS MAJOR WORKS 104 (Sabrina Hassumani ed., 
2002). 
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hard to see how brand parodies pose any cognizable threat to trademark 
law’s informational goals. Sure, the public might think less of the 
trademark holder as a result of the criticism, but trademark law has never 
addressed itself to that kind of harm.
102
 To the contrary, the fact that the 
defendant is using the plaintiff’s brand to talk about the plaintiff, even 
for money, is a defense to infringement.
103
 
Brand parodies, then, are a natural and desirable part of a social 
conversation that takes place through the phenomenon of branding. 
Trademark owners benefit from that conversation, but they are not the 
only ones with a right to speak. 
III. A DEFENSE FOR BRAND PARODIES 
True brand parodies thus have social value and are unlikely to cause 
confusion or loss of distinctiveness of the targeted mark; trademark 
courts should rarely enjoin them. In practice, however, litigation against 
brand parodies can drag on for years, with courts equivocating over what 
rules to apply and how.
104
 And some courts enjoin them based on 
questionable evidence of confusion. Both the equivocation and the 
misapplication of the law may well result from discomfort over the 
commercial nature of these parodies, or from a perception of exploitation 
and free riding. Whatever the cause, the slipperiness of trademark 
doctrine gives courts room to find infringement or dilution, even under 
dubious circumstances, if they are motivated to do so. 
We need more reliable protection for brand parodies under both 
trademark infringement and dilution law. A defense that can be litigated 
pre-trial would add great certainty to the process and protect speech. 
Even contemplating such a defense, however, raises a host of definitional 
and policy questions. What is parody, and why should we privilege it 
over other forms of critical speech such as satire? How should courts 
distinguish between real parodies and fakes? Assuming parody deserves 
some kind of legal protection, what form should the defense take? 
Should the defense be absolute once it is established that the defendant’s 
brand is in fact a qualifying parody? Or should a brand parody be illegal 
 
 102 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
 103 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217-18 (3d 
Cir. 2005); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 104 The Charbucks case, for example, has been up and down to the Second Circuit 
three times in the nine years it has been litigated so far, and there is no end in sight. See 
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 102-05 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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if it causes enough confusion? We see no easy answer to these questions; 
in particular, we recognize the hazards of distinguishing between 
parodies and other forms of critical speech. Nonetheless, we believe that 
there is good reason to provide special protection for parodies, while at 
the same time preserving space for satire and other expressive uses of 
marks. The difficulty of drawing lines should not prevent us from 
protecting parodies that are clearly on the right side of the line, wherever 
drawn. 
A. What Is a Parody? Does It Matter? 
To create a defense for brand parodies, we need either a definition of 
what a parody is or a general principle that encompasses brand parodies 
along with other forms of protected uses of a trademark. 
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
105
 a copyright fair use case, the 
Supreme Court sought to define parody. While it drew from classic and 
dictionary definitions a fairly broad definition of a parody that involved 
imitation of a work for the purpose of comic effect,
106
 the actual 
definition it adopted was narrower: “[T]he use of some elements of a 
prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, 
comments on that author’s works.”
107
 Works that use elements from an 
original for comic effect but that do not comment directly on the original, 
by contrast, are classed by the Court as satire, not parody. The court 
reasoned that parody needs the original in order to work, but satire could 




 105 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 106 Id. at 579-80 (“The germ of parody lies in the definition of the 
Greek parodeia, quoted in Judge Nelson’s Court of Appeals dissent, as ‘a song sung 
alongside another.’ Modern dictionaries accordingly describe a parody as a ‘literary or 
artistic work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for comic effect 
or ridicule,’ or as a ‘composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of 
thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make 
them appear ridiculous.’” (citations omitted)). 
 107 Id. at 580. 
 108 Id. at 580-81 (“Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has 
some claim to use the creation of its victim’s (or collective victims’) imagination, 
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act 
of borrowing.”). In fact, however, there may be non-parodic uses that depend on a 
particular work. Machinima, for instance, makes videos out of content from individual 
video games, and fan fiction builds off of books or movies. While in theory the fan could 
build off of some other work, the entire point of machinima or fan fiction is to pay 
homage to a particular piece of culture. See Michael Choe, The Problem of the Parody-
Satire Distinction: Fair Use in Machinima and Other Fan Created Works, 37 RUTGERS 
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Campbell emphatically did not say that parody was protected and 
satire was not. Indeed, it strongly suggested that both satire and parody 
had claims to be fair use under copyright law where they did not 
substitute for the original goods.
109
 But in the wake of Campbell, many 
courts in copyright and trademark cases have treated the parody/satire 
distinction not as a point of discussion, but as a bright line rule. Most 
notably, the Ninth Circuit in Dr. Seuss held that because The Cat NOT In 
the Hat was a satire, not a parody of Dr. Seuss’s books, it was neither 
copyright fair use nor speech protected from trademark infringement.
110
 
The result is that under existing law, there is a substantial benefit to 
having your work classed as a parody rather than a satire.
111
 For many of 
the examples we discussed in Part I, this is generally not an issue; most 
are pretty clearly targeting the brand owner at least in part. But other 
cases that clearly make reference to a trademark owner seem closer to 
satire — social commentary — than a parody of the trademark itself. In 
L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,
112
 the court held that a 
 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 114-16 (2011). 
 109 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 n.14 (“[W]hen there is little or no risk of market 
substitution, whether because of the large extent of transformation of the earlier work, the 
new work’s minimal distribution in the market, the small extent to which it borrows from 
an original, or other factors, taking parodic aim at an original is a less critical factor in the 
analysis, and looser forms of parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with 
lesser justification for the borrowing than would otherwise be required.”). By contrast, 
Justice Kennedy was alone in concluding that the court’s analysis should be limited to 
parody and should not extend to satire. Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is not 
enough that the parody use the original in a humorous fashion, however creative that 
humor may be. The parody must target the original, and not just its general style, the 
genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a whole . . . .”). 
 110 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405-06 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he claim of parody is no defense ‘where the purpose of the similarity is to 
capitalize on a famous mark’s popularity for the defendant’s own commercial use.’” 
(citation omitted)). For trenchant criticism of this decision, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. 
Seuss, the Juice, and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 546, 585-633 (1998). For a contrary approach, see Blanch v. Koons, 467 
F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006). See also MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 23-44 (2012); Rebecca Tushnet, Scary 
Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2133, 2139 (2011). 
 111 Indeed, several copyright cases bend over backwards to find parody in what is 
really some other form of commentary or criticism. See, e.g., Northland Family Planning 
Clinic, Inc. v. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, 868 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (edit of 
pro-choice video to intersperse anti-choice arguments was a “parody”; parody doesn’t 
need to be humorous). 
 112 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987).  
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pornography magazine that published a fake catalog called “L.L. Beam’s 
Back to School Sex Catalog” was a lawful parody of L.L. Bean’s Back to 
School Catalog.
113
 Whatever commentary the Back to School Sex 
Catalog might be making doesn’t seem to be about L.L. Bean per se. And 
in MasterCard International, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 
Inc.,
114
 the court held that Ralph Nader’s political ad in the 2000 
presidential campaign based on the MasterCard “Priceless” ad campaign 
was a lawful parody.
115
 But while Nader’s ad was clearly social 
commentary, and while Nader argued that his ad was in fact designed in 
part to mock MasterCard, the ad was really satire, not parody. It was 
designed to use a well-known ad campaign to make a social commentary 
about something — campaign finance — unrelated to MasterCard. 
Indeed, one might question (as both Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and 
the Sixth Circuit opinion did) whether 2 Live Crew’s “Big Hairy 
Woman” song was really a parody of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” or 
just a take-off from it. Justice Kennedy worried in Campbell “that not 
just any commercial takeoff is rationalized post hoc as a parody.”
116
 But 
arguably a preference for parody over satire gives just such an incentive. 
In many cases, therefore, the parties fight about whether a work is in 
fact a parody at all as a prelude to (or perhaps a proxy for) debating 
whether it is legal. For courts that focus on the parody/satire distinction, 
that requires them to make some tough choices in deciding what qualifies 
as a parody: is a subsidiary purpose to make fun of the plaintiff enough, 
or must it be the primary focus of the defendant’s use? How confident 
must we be that it is a parody? Does the defendant’s intent to make a 
parody (or not) matter? Does it matter how the audience perceives it? 
Consider, for instance, Chik-Fil-A’s complaint over Eat More Kale T-
shirts.
117
 Bo Muller-Moore, the maker of the shirts, said he didn’t intend 
to make fun of Chik-Fil-A or its “Eat More Chikin” slogan.
118
 But some 
 
 113 Id. at 34. 
 114 No. 00 Civ.6068(GBD), 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). Full 
disclosure: one of us (Lemley) represented Nader in this case. 
 115 Id. at *2-9. 
 116 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 600 (1994) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 117 The fight over Eat More Kale is now the subject of an upcoming documentary, A 
DEFIANT DUDE. 
 118 Bo Muller-Moore, EAT MORE KALE, http://eatmorekale.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 
2013) (“I’m asked all the time, ‘Hey Bo, what do you mean by “Eat More Kale” and 
where did the phrase come from?’ . . . Most obviously, it’s about eating healthier. Kale 
can be delicious and a SUPER FOOD! You *should* eat more of it. . . . Eat More Kale is 
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people might see it that way, or at least see it as a takeoff that provides a 
humorous contrast with the fast-food mark. If we focus on the 
defendant’s intent, the result would be that Bo’s shirts would not be 
parodies, but identical shirts made by someone who sought to mock the 
fast food industry would be. If instead we focus on how consumers 
perceive the shirts, we face an expensive fact determination ancillary to 
the primary likelihood of confusion determination. And it is not clear 
what value that information has. 
Perhaps we could use the court as a gatekeeper, bending over 
backwards to perceive parody if at all possible and weeding cases out 
pre-trial.
119
 That’s the approach copyright law takes, though copyright 
has always been less concerned than trademark with the reactions of 
individual consumers.
120
 A judicial judgment about whether something is 
a parody has advantages over both the defendant’s belief and the 
public’s, though it risks missing parodies that appeal to a younger or 
culturally different audience than tends to inhabit the federal bench. A 
number of people have worried that the Sixth Circuit in Campbell simply 
didn’t “get” 2 Live Crew’s music;
121
 one might similarly worry about 
 
about supporting small business, business that actually cares and hasn’t been swallowed 
up by profit-hungry, corporate mentality.”). 
 119 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 & n.16 (the parodic character need only be 
reasonably perceivable, and need not be of high quality). One study finds that when 
Campbell is cited in a trademark parody case, the defendant almost always wins. See 
Simon, The Confusion Trap, supra note 61, at 29-40. 
 120 See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 26, at 1604 (acknowledging and largely 
defending “norm followership” in trademark law); Dogan & Lemley, Grounding 
Trademark, supra note 26, at 1693-98 (discussing ways in which trademark law defines 
itself by reference to consumer attitudes, which in turn are often shaped by legal rules); 
Jeanne Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (draft at 33), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2272235 (trademark law is more 
focused on actual consumer reaction than other IP laws). Arguably this is the approach 
the court took in Walking Mountain in rejecting a survey purporting to show confusion. 
Cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, Of Mutant Copyrights, Mangled Trademarks, and Barbie’s 
Beneficence: The Influence of Copyright on Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND 
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 41, at 481 (arguing that 
trademark has borrowed speech-protective rules from copyright’s parody cases). 
 121 See, e.g., Gary Myers, Trademark Parody: Lessons from the Copyright Decision in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 181, 187 (1996) 
(“At this point, [Campbell] addressed the central error in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, the 
presumptive weight it gave to 2 Live Crew’s commercial motivation for its parody.”); cf. 
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip-Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright, 
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006) (situating Campbell in the context of 
hip-hop norms about reuse). 
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judges not “getting” the Enjoy Cocaine poster in Gemini Rising or a host 
of other modern parodies. 
Perhaps there is a way for trademark law to avoid drawing this line 
altogether. It is not clear that trademark owners have any strong need to 
prevent satire. In Campbell, the Court focused on the defendant’s need to 
use the plaintiff’s work rather than any other work, suggesting that satire 
required more justification for copying because it didn’t have to use the 
plaintiff’s work.
122
 That argument has always rung a bit hollow even in 
copyright; if no one wants their works to be used as a basis for satire, the 
fact that there are many other potential plaintiffs whose works I can’t use 
either is cold comfort indeed.
123
 But the argument seems to have even 
less force in trademark law. Unlike copyright, which is designed to 
prevent copying and to give copyright owners control over the use of the 
work itself, trademark law cares only about the brand-product connection 
in the minds of consumers and how that might affect producer 
incentives.
124
 There is little reason to think that either parody or satire 
interferes with that connection; to the contrary, both will often reinforce 
the connection by calling to mind the famous brand or ad campaign they 
mimic.
125
 And there is even less reason to think that satire will cause 




 122 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81. 
 123 See Keller & Tushnet, supra note 65, at 979-80 (making this point). 
 124 For discussion, see, for example, Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra 
note 56. 
 125 Barton Beebe has made this point about tarnishment. See Barton Beebe, A Defense 
of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1143, 1150-51 (2006). For general discussion, see Desai, From Trademarks to 
Brands, supra note 58, at 1007-08; Heymann, The Law of Reputation, supra note 96, at 
1341.  
We dealt above with a related argument — that satire will “overexpose” a mark and 
therefore weaken its value. For criticism of that argument, see generally Mark A. Lemley, 
Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 
(2004) [hereinafter Ex Ante]. Lemley notes: 
Where a work is truly iconic, even repeated debasement is unlikely to affect 
public perceptions. Justin Hughes observes that the Statue of Liberty, the Mona 
Lisa, Mount Rushmore, and the Eiffel Tower retain their iconic status despite 
repeated uses and abuses in many different contexts. So too do the works of 
Shakespeare and the characters Frankenstein (and his monster), Dracula, 
Scrooge, Uncle Sam, and King Arthur. 
Id. at 146 n.63 (citing Justin Hughes, “Recording” Intellectual Property and Overlooked 
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 961 (1999)). 
 126 For criticism of the distinction, see Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and 
  
2013] Parody as Brand 503 
A number of scholars, including one of the authors, have argued 
recently that trademark law needs a trademark injury requirement under 
which plaintiffs could block only uses that actually changed consumer 
perceptions or behavior.
127
 Under a trademark injury filter, courts might 
not have to decide whether a particular referential use was parody or 
satire, because the law should protect both of them in the ordinary case in 
which neither parody nor satire is likely to have any material impact on 
consumer purchasing decisions. While parodies and satires may well 
influence consumers’ view of a brand, neither is likely to do so in a way 
trademark law should care about — by confusing consumers at the point 
of purchase or interfering with the uniqueness of the mark as signifier. 
Importing the Rogers v. Grimaldi test from the right of publicity may 
effect just such an end-run, depending on how broadly the courts define 
“artistic relevance.” We can imagine a court concluding that Outkast’s 
song “Rosa Parks” was artistically relevant to Rosa Parks because it 
contained the line “everyone move to the back of the bus,” even though 
the song was not in fact about Rosa Parks at all.
128
 
Under existing law, however, trademark holders can prevail if there’s 
confusion about their sponsorship of a product, even if the confusion 
causes them no harm. As a result, it’s at least theoretically possible to 
have consumer confusion in the case of satire; consumers could, we 
suppose, be confused over whether the trademark holder has made the 
satirical point. We think it’s doubtful, but the possibility of such 
confusion may make it harder to resolve cases early, without resort to 
any likelihood of confusion analysis. 
Parodies, however, by their very nature make confusion improbable, 
and dilution highly unlikely. Trademark holders are unlikely to develop 
brands that lampoon themselves, and consumers are unlikely to believe 
that they’ve done so.
129
 And as the Louis Vuitton court recognized, 
 
the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 461, 478 
(2006); Ochoa, supra note 110, at 548-64, 609-10. 
 127 See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 448-53; Lemley 
& McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 56, at 188-89; McKenna, Consumer 
Decision-Making Theory, supra note 41, at 124-33; Tushnet, From A to B, supra note 36, 
at 1368-73; cf. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 176-81 (2012) (proposing 
an analogous copyright injury requirement). 
 128 As it happens, the court found the issue to present a question of fact that could not 
be resolved on summary judgment. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459-60 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
 129 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“[T]he 
unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons 
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parodies will rarely dilute, because their commentary calls attention to 
the famous trademark and reinforces its fame.
130
 Classifying a use as a 
parody should therefore enable earlier resolution of cases even under 
current legal standards. In an ideal world, of course, courts would do a 
better job of handling expressive uses of trademarks more generally.
131
 
But given the realities of existing law, we think that parodies, at the very 
least, present an attractive case for special treatment. 
Doing so requires us to confront the definitional problem directly.
132
 
It’s not an easy task; because parody and satire have more commonalities 
than differences, courts reach decisions that sometimes leave us 
scratching our heads.
133
 But at least in cases of clear parody, we see some 
value in carving out a separate defense. So we proceed here with the task 
even while understanding that at some level it is futile, because defining 
parody may enable us to take at least some easy cases out of court early. 
We think a parody need not be intended solely as a parody; many 
brands seek to convey multiple messages at once. Nor should parody 
depend on the defendant’s intent that something be a parody; it is worth 
noting that 2 Live Crew originally defended its song as a cover of the 
Orbison original, not as a parody. To focus on the defendant’s intent 
 
of their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing 
market.”). However, there is some evidence of both self-parody as an advertising strategy 
(Isuzu’s “He’s Lying” commercials) and even a willingness to license some parody, as 
Weird Al Yankovic does. 
 130 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 267 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
 131 See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 444-48; 
McGeveran, supra note 14, at 109-23; William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, 
Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 132 For a critical analysis of how courts determine whether parody “can reasonably be 
perceived” in copyright cases, see generally David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception and 
Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 779. 
 133 The Second Circuit, for example, described “Charbucks” as “at most, a subtle 
satire of the Starbucks Marks.” Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 
F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009). We’re not sure what the difference is between a subtle satire 
of a product and a parody of that product; according to the Supreme Court, at least, the 
use of a mark to poke even subtle fun at that mark would be parody rather than satire. 
The court seems to have thought that “Charbucks” was at most a joke about the dark roast 
of the Starbucks coffee (and therefore directed at dark roast generally), ignoring its rather 
more obvious implication that people are wasting their money buying expensive cups of 
Starbucks coffee. The fact that a court of appeals can garble the distinction in a case this 
easy gives us pause in endorsing it. 
The Second Circuit ultimately affirmed a finding that Charbucks was not dilutive, 
using the ordinary dilution test rather than relying on parody. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s 
Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 12-354-cv, 2013 WL 6037227 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2013). 
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would not only be unworkable but would cause similar uses to be treated 
differently depending on the defendant’s state of mind and how careful 
they were in documenting their intent. 
That leaves the public and the courts as possible arbiters of what is a 
parody. Both have their problems. Relying on the public simply falls 
back on the likelihood of confusion standard, here to determine not the 
fact of confusion but whether people thought the trademark owner or a 
third party was the target of the defendant’s use. It would mean that it is 
essentially impossible to resolve parody cases pre-trial. The best (or 
least-bad) alternative may be to follow copyright and have judges make 
their own assessment of whether something is a parody, putting a thumb 
on the scale of finding parody in doubtful cases. That’s not a perfect 
solution, because judges may not “get” the joke in many popular culture 
cases. But it may be the best we can do as long as courts are unwilling to 
put satire on equal footing with parody. 
B. Implementing a Parody Defense 
The next question is how to implement such a defense. Should parody 
serve as a stand-alone defense that automatically defeats any likelihood 
of confusion? Or should courts inquire into confusion, allowing the 
parody only when confusion is impossible or highly unlikely? What kind 
of confusion, for that matter, should count? 
It might seem logical to look to Rogers v. Grimaldi, given its value in 
non-brand parody cases. As discussed above, Rogers allows use of 
trademarks in expressive products as long as the mark has artistic 
relevance to the work and does not expressly mislead.
134
 But Rogers 
offers little guidance outside the expressive work context. A rule that 
considers a trademark’s relationship to a movie, book, or video game 
does not apply readily to names of commodities such as coffee or dog 
toys. At the same time, parodies match up with the Second Circuit’s core 
insight — that the risk of confusion with some sorts of uses might be so 
small, and countervailing speech interests so substantial, that courts 
should dispense with analysis of likelihood of confusion.
135
 The trick is 
finding the doctrinal vehicle for analyzing parodies. 
We think that trademark’s nominative fair use doctrine — with some 
tweaking — could serve as an adequate tool for resolving most brand 
parody cases without resort to likelihood of confusion. In cases in which 
 
 134 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
 135 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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the nominative fair use defense does not apply, courts should turn to a 
full analysis of likelihood of confusion and dilution. When this happens, 
however, they must take care to avoid some of the pitfalls that have led 
courts to find obvious parodies infringing. We offer some preliminary 
thoughts about how that analysis ought to proceed. 
1. Nominative Fair Use. 
Nominative fair use is a common law doctrine that allows certain uses 
of trademarks to refer to the mark holder itself, or its products. The two 
primary tests used in nominative fair use cases come from the Ninth and 
Third circuits. The Ninth Circuit, which first formally devised the test, 
allows a nominative use if the defendant meets three conditions: 
First, the product or service . . . [is] not readily identifiable 
without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark 
or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the 
product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that 
would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.
136
 
The Third Circuit applies a similar test, but its third prong asks whether 
“defendant’s conduct or language reflect[s] the true and accurate 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.”
137
 
Admittedly, both of these tests turn in part on consumer expectations; 
courts cannot assess whether a defendant’s use of a mark is “accurate” — 
or whether it improperly suggests endorsement — without some 
 
 136 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992); see also Toyota Motor Sales, U.S., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175-83 (9th 
Cir. 2010); cf. Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 
2013) (recognizing and applying nominative fair use but without adopting any particular 
definition). 
 137 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir. 
2005); see also id. at 223 & n.4 (“Fairness is a distinct concept from confusion, and it 
should be measured through a distinct inquiry.”). The court also fiddled a bit with the 
other New Kids factors. In full, the Third Circuit’s nominative fair use standard requires 
the defendant to show: 
(1) that the use of plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the plaintiff’s 
product or service and the defendant’s product or service; (2) that the defendant 
uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s 
product; and (3) that the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and 
accurate relationship between [the parties]. 
Id. at 222. 
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reference to how consumers will perceive the use.
138
 As a result, critics 
have complained that nominative fair use simply re-entangles courts in 
the same likelihood of confusion inquiries that define infringement in the 
first place.
139
 Yet the role of consumer expectations is quite different in 
the two contexts. In the general likelihood of confusion context, 
consumer perception is the very heart of the inquiry: the factfinder must 
assess whether, given the nature of the parties, their products, and the 
marks at issue, consumers might mistakenly perceive a source- or 
sponsorship-oriented relationship between the parties. The defendant 
does not ordinarily have any particular reason for using the plaintiff’s 
trademark, so the factfinder has no purpose against which to measure the 
nature of the use. In nominative fair use, in contrast, the defendant has a 
reason to use the mark; the factfinder’s task is to assess how the use 
measures up against that legitimate purpose. This at least admits the 
possibility of a textual inquiry that relies on the court’s objective 
assessment of whether the defendant’s use promotes valid referential 
goals or instead appears intended to mislead.
140
 As a result, judges may 
be able to resolve nominative fair use issues without prolonged factual 




 138 See, e.g., Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1176 (noting that third prong of nominative fair use 
— whether defendant has improperly suggested sponsorship or endorsement — should be 
assessed from the perspective of the “reasonably prudent consumer”); Century 21, 425 
F.3d at 231 (considering whether defendant’s behavior “rendered the use inaccurate or 
was somehow misleading as to any endorsement or relationship”). 
 139 See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 14, at 88-97 (arguing that the substitution of fair 
use requirements for likelihood of confusion analysis is a significant problem that 
prejudices fair uses and prolongs litigation); see also, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, Trademark 
Use, supra note 26 (making the point more generally). 
 140 See, e.g., Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1181-82 (considering context of website and domain 
name in evaluating second and third factors of nominative fair use standard). 
 141 See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224 (“Our test for nominative fair use considers 
distinct factors that are readily susceptible to judicial inquiry.”). Importantly, the Third 
Circuit approach, unlike the Ninth Circuit, treats nominative use as a defense even in the 
face of confusion, while the Ninth Circuit could be read as saying that if consumers are 
confused as to sponsorship or affiliation the defendant is disentitled to a defense. So 
understood, the Ninth Circuit test wouldn’t be a defense at all, but collapses into the 
confusion inquiry. Indeed, some circuits, like the Sixth Circuit, view nominative fair use 
as redundant because, they believe, it protects uses that are inherently unlikely to cause 
confusion. See, e.g., PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., LLC, 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“This circuit has never followed the nominative fair use analysis, always having 
applied [the circuit’s likelihood of confusion] test.”), abrogated by KP Permanent Make-
Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). For criticism of the Ninth 
Circuit on this ground, see Greg Lastowka, Nominative Fair Use Makes No Sense (Oct. 
9, 2013) (working paper), available at 
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In essence, the nominative fair use inquiry asks whether the defendant 
had a legitimate reason to use the mark to evoke the trademark holder; if 
so, the doctrine considers how the actual use matches up against that 
purpose. The doctrine recognizes that certain forms of communication 
require use of trademarks to achieve their expressive goals. You can’t 
really compare a new product to an entrenched market leader without 
using the leader’s trademark. It’s hard to tout the sale of after-market 
parts without naming the cars that they were designed to repair. A news 




Indeed, it is often virtually impossible to refer to a particular 
product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference 
or any other such purpose without using the mark. For example, 
reference to a large automobile manufacturer based in Michigan 
would not differentiate among the Big Three; reference to a large 
Japanese manufacturer of home electronics would narrow the 
field to a dozen or more companies. Much useful social and 
commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers 
were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they 




In all of these contexts, the nature of the defendant’s communicative 
goals requires use of the trademark; the question for the court is really 
whether the defendant’s use of the mark is coextensive with those goals, 
or whether it has exceeded its justification. 
If, as we believe, trademark parodies are a unique and non-replicable 
form of speech about trademark holders, then they resemble the sorts of 
uses that nominative fair use seeks to protect. They involve speech about 
the trademark holder, and they cannot serve their inherent function — 
indeed, they can’t be a parody — without borrowing from the original.
144
 
Nominative fair use thus offers a ready framework for analyzing 
trademark parodies. But how do we analyze the critical third factor (i.e., 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338296. 
 142 See WCVB-TV v. Bos. Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 143 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306-07 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 144 See Mattel v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(applying nominative fair use when defendant “used Mattel’s Barbie figure and head in 
his works to conjure up associations of Mattel, while at the same time to identify his own 
work, which is a criticism and parody of Barbie”). 
  
2013] Parody as Brand 509 
whether the defendant’s actions match up to its legitimate speech-related 
objectives)? 
In many ways, the considerations underlying nominative fair use 
mirror those at issue in copyright law’s treatment of parody. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, to do its job, a parody must borrow 
substantially from the target of its scorn.
145
 It must borrow at least 
enough to evoke the work in the mind of the observer. Yet that’s not all 
— the borrower can take more than necessary to evoke the work, as long 
as it’s done to further the parody and doesn’t come so close to the 




This logic folds nicely into trademark analysis of nominative fair use. 
First, in order to present an effective parody of a trademark, it is 
necessary to borrow substantially from that mark. As long as a parodic 
character can “reasonably be perceived,” the necessity kicks in.
147
 
Second, the court must examine the defendant’s use of the mark to 
determine whether it goes too far beyond the parodic purpose. If the 
parody pervades the defendant’s use, then substantial taking is justified; 
if, however, the parody is hard to perceive and the taking is substantial, 
then this requirement might not be satisfied. Finally, the court should 
consider the overall context of the use to determine whether the 
defendant did anything beyond mere use of the mark that suggests 
source-affiliation or sponsorship by the trademark holder. Precision on 
this last point is critical: as noted above, a reading of the Ninth Circuit 
test that permits evidence of confusion to defeat the defense would 
render nominative fair use a nullity. The third factor must refer to acts 
beyond the parody itself that cause confusion. 
2. Trademark Standards When Nominative Fair Use Doesn’t Apply. 
The above analysis should resolve cases involving trademark parodies. 
In some cases, however, the court might believe that the parodist went 
 
 145 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587-89 (1994). In fact, the 
line between parody and satire isn’t as clear here either. Haute Diggity Dog could have 
chosen to parody a brand other than Louis Vuitton, so it didn’t need the Vuitton mark in a 
strict sense. 
 146 See id. at 588 (“Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much 
more is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the song’s overriding purpose 
and character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may 
serve as a market substitute for the original.”). 
 147 See id. at 582. 
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well beyond what was necessary to achieve its expressive goals, creating 
at least the possibility of confusion or dilution by doing something other 
than parodying the mark. Or it might conclude that the defense doesn’t 
apply because the defendant’s brand is purely satire or other humor 
rather than parody. When this happens, the court must move beyond 
nominative fair use and tackle, head on, the questions of likelihood of 
confusion and dilution.
148
 We have some thoughts about the appropriate 
analysis in these expressive non-parody cases. 
First, to the extent that the court perceives a parodic purpose but 
believes that the defendant’s use of the mark exceeds that purpose and 
risks confusing the public, the court should resist the call for a complete 
injunction in favor of one that addresses the excesses while preserving 
the parody. Here, too, nominative fair use offers useful precedent. As the 
Ninth Circuit held in Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari,
149
 courts 
considering nominative fair use cases should tailor injunctive relief to the 
particular excesses that create the risk of confusion. “At the very least,” 
the court held, injunctions must be crafted to allow the defendant to 
achieve its nominative objectives. “Trademarks are part of our common 




Second, courts should absolutely reject the notion that confusion as to 
permission is ever actionable as a matter of trademark law. For all we 
know, some substantial portion of the public may assume that trademark 
holders have a legal right to prevent any unauthorized use of their mark. 
It would be odd lawmaking indeed if courts defined legal rules by what 
the public thinks the law is, regardless of how misguided those 
perceptions may be. Of course, some amount of circularity is endemic in 
trademark law; the fact that infringement turns on the risk of consumer 
confusion makes it inevitable that the law will sometimes over-protect 
 
 148 Something similar may be required where the brand owner has itself entered the 
market for self-parody. While that prospect seems unlikely in the abstract, see Richard A. 
Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 74 (1992), there is evidence 
that brands not only license the right to make fun of them from time to time, but even run 
advertisements or sell products that seem parodic, such as Louis Vuitton’s graffiti 
collection. The possibility of self-parody may heighten the chance of confusion, though 
we are skeptical that any brand owner should own the right to parody itself. See generally 
Lemley & McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, supra note 56 (arguing that brand owners have 
no sound legal claim to prevent use of their mark in unrelated markets). 
 149 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 150 Id. at 1185. 
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marks.
151
 But at least in the ordinary case, the claim of confusion has 
some plausible relevance to trademark law’s goal of protecting consumer 
expectations about who makes or stands behind products. The fact that a 
consumer might mistakenly believe that a trademark holder gave 
permission to make fun of itself has nothing to do with that kind of 
confusion. It is a quintessential example of “irrelevant confusion.”
152
 
Third, in cases in which a brand use is also making an expressive 
statement, the expressive nature of the defendant’s use should influence 
the entire inquiry into likelihood of confusion and dilution, just as it does 
for fair use in copyright law. Strength and similarity of marks, for 
example, should not serve its ordinary role of cutting in favor of 
confusion. If anything, for more famous marks, the satire will arguably 
be more recognizable; and, as discussed above, significant borrowing of 
the trademark may be important to the message being conveyed even if 
the defendant is not directly parodying the brand.
153
 Analysis of 
similarity should operate on a sliding scale, in which the stronger the 
expressive nature, the closer the marks may come to one another without 
this factor weighing in favor of confusion.
154
 
The dilution inquiry should likewise recognize that the very nature of 
expressive works will often require deliberate use of a recognizable 
mark. As a result, factors such as the mark’s renown and the intent to 
create an association between the marks cannot serve their usual function 
of cutting in favor of dilution. Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit recognized in 
Louis Vuitton, several of the dilution factors arguably cut in opposite 
directions. The more famous the mark, for example, the less likely that a 
parody will impair its distinctiveness.
155
 Courts in dilution cases should 
 
 151 See Gibson, supra note 65, at 912; cf. Dogan & Lemley, Merchandising Right, 
supra note 56 (arguing that trademark law must sometimes serve as a norm entrepreneur 
rather than a norm follower). 
 152 See Lemley & McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, supra note 36, at 427. 
 153 Cf. Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1836 (2007) (noting the irony of strong, famous marks 
needing protection from confusion); Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked 
Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1354 (1980) (same). 
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consider the factors in light of the ultimate question: whether the 
defendant’s use affects the famous mark’s ability to serve as a “unique 
identifier of its source.”
156
 
Fourth, given the value of even non-parodic but expressive uses, such 
as satire, small amounts of confusion should not justify an injunction. 
While trademark law generally finds infringement if even a small 
minority of consumers are confused,
157
 it does so because there is no 
countervailing interest on the other side. By contrast, where there are 
consumer interests on both sides of the ledger, trademark law has tended 
to require higher confusion thresholds. To prove a mark generic, for 
instance, the law requires that a substantial majority of the public thinks 
it is, because the consumers who don’t think so will be injured.
158
 A 
parody or satire gives consumers who get the joke an interest in the 
defendant’s brand that an injunction would stymie. Before we impose 
that injunction, we should be significantly more confident that harm to 
the confused consumers outweighs the harm to those who have an 
interest in the defendant’s speech. The fact that there are interests on 
both sides may also affect the choice of remedy. Trademark law 
generally gives little shrift to disclaimers,
159
 but parody and satire may be 
 
retain their status despite constant dilution). 
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Cir. 1989); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 
1963). Descriptive fair use does the same, providing a partial defense that can be 
overcome in some circumstances, but only with a higher showing of confusion. See KP 
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 159 See JR Tobacco of Am., Inc. v. Davidoff of Geneva (CT), Inc., 957 F. Supp. 426, 
437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[G]enerally, a disclaimer is ineffective to cure a literally false 
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circumstances where the appropriate response to all but the highest levels 
of confusion is not an injunction or a change to the defendant’s brand, 
but merely requiring the defendant to make clear that they are not 
associated with the plaintiff. 
Doing so may also avoid conflicts with the First Amendment. The 
Ninth Circuit has emphasized the significant risks trademark law poses to 
speech in cases like Barbie Girl.
160
 And it has done so even in cases that 
have no arguable claim to parody, such as a football player objecting to 
his depiction in a football video game.
161
 Laura Heymann has explained 
how the low confusion threshold makes the problem worse.
162
 And as 
one of the authors has argued, that risk is heightened when the remedy is 
an injunction against the protected speech.
163
 In the absence of a pure 
defense for brand parodies or satires, the combination of a higher 
confusion threshold and limited remedies may end up providing at least 
some speech protection. 
CONCLUSION 
Brand parodies serve useful social purposes and are unlikely to 
interfere with any legitimate interests of trademark owners. But the fact 
that they are both parodies and brands means that their legal status is 
unclear. We think brand parodies deserve clear legal protection, and that 
existing law can provide that protection if it is properly understood. 
 
 
TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND MONOPOLIES § 5.31 (4th ed. 2013). For a 
discussion of trademark disclaimers, see generally Laura A. Heymann, Reading the 
Product: Warnings, Disclaimers, and Literary Theory, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393 
(2010).  
 160 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902-07 (9th Cir. 2002); see 
also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 161 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239-41 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying 
Rogers test to non-parodic use of a brand, and noting that the rule was the same whether 
the defendant’s use was in the title or body of the work). 
 162 See Laura A. Heymann, The Public’s Domain in Trademark Law: A First 
Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV. 651, 702-03 (2009). 
 163 See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 216-24 (1998). 
